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Introduction
Like every Bachelor of Arts program, the University of Exeter provides a set of 
reasons to undertake a BA in philosophy aimed at prospective students and 
their parents. Here1 are two such reasons:
First: ‘From the beginning you’ll be encouraged and taught how to think 
rigorously, defend your views, understand different opinions and ultimately 
develop a sharp, analytical and open mind’.
Second: ‘Get ready for your future career by developing a range of skills 
valued by a wide range of employers from the media to teaching and the 
public, private and charity sectors’.
On the face of it, these reasons align: the former lists a set of skills related 
to your philosophy education; the latter, how those skills aid in your even-
tually being well-employed. I’m going to argue that the relationship between 
the kind of education we’re talking about – what we might call ‘humanities’, 
‘arts’ or (if you’re from the U.S.) ‘liberal arts’ – and its being emphasized as 
critical for future employment, is more troublesome than appearances first 
suggest. In short, I’ll argue that the consequences of success in humanities 
education, gainful employment say, actively works against the mindset 
required to gain that education. I don’t pretend this is a particularly original 
claim,2 but I’ll get there via an original route: Thi Nguyen’s recent work on 
games (Nguyen 2020). I hope this provides some new insights into the nature 
of the problem.
I’ll start in section 2 by describing the relevant aspects of Nguyen’s view. In 
section 3 I’ll shift to humanities education characterizing its value and draw-
ing parallels between it and Nguyen’s account of games. I’ll then (in section 4) 
introduce the notion of ‘misalignment’: a circumstance where the conse-
quences of success or failure in a game undermines some of the goods 
playing that game is supposed to generate. In section 5 I’ll argue that 
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misalignment plausibly occurs in humanities education. The consequences of 
success in humanities education – particularly those relating to employment – 
make it difficult for students to approach their education in a way which 
achieves some of the stated goals of that education. Finally, in section 6 I’ll 
sketch a space of solutions. A few caveats.
First, I’ll use the term ‘humanities’ as a catch-all for what is often called 
‘arts’ or ‘liberal arts’ education. This includes, but is not limited to, history, 
cultural anthropology, various ‘studies’ disciplines and so forth. I’ll often refer 
to philosophy simply because it’s what I know best. Second, I’ll not be arguing 
that university education literally is a game in Nguyen’s sense; it may be so or 
not, but what matters for my position is that there are relevant analogies. 
Third, I won’t deny that humanities education makes students more suitable 
for employment. Rather, I suggest that because the success or failure of such 
an education has such high stakes downstream, it undermines the uptake of 
some critical value of that education. Fourth, my claims are limited to huma-
nities education. It may well be that more vocational education (the law, say) 
or more scientific subjects are misaligned to greater or lesser extents in the 
sense I’ll discuss, but that is beyond my scope here. So, let’s think about 
games.
Striving games
Nguyen focuses on Suitsian games. We can understand these as having three 
components. First, pre-lusory goals, a ‘specific achievable state of affairs’ (Suits 
1973/2014, 40, italics in original). Many activities could count as pre-lusory 
goals: climbing a mountain, hitting a wicket with a ball, figuring out who 
killed Mr Gold, writing an essay. Second, these goals are transformed and 
structured by a set of constitutive constraints which delineate what actions are 
allowed and are not in achieving that goal: climbing without ropes, bowling 
a ball at a wicket from a specific distance with a straight arm, suggesting 
murder suspects, locations and weapons one at a time, fitting the essay 
within a specific number of words. Third, from the pre-lusory goals and the 
constitutive constraints emerge the lusory goals: basically, how to achieve the 
aim within the constraints. A successful ropeless ascent; bowling the batter 
out; winning Cluedo; passing the assignment. Players take up temporary ends 
towards meeting such goals. Although not all games are Suitsian, many are: 
from sports and parlour-games to board and computer games. When I say 
‘games’, I mean games of that nature.
We play games for a variety of reasons, and Nguyen makes a crucial 
distinction between striving and achievement play. In the latter, the player’s 
motivations and the game’s goal align: the player plays to win the game. The 
former is more complex: while the goal of the game is to win, the player is 
motivated by something else. Perhaps they want to have a good time with 
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their friends, challenge themselves, or experience the joys of the game itself. 
In doing so, players do typically aim to win, but winning isn’t the point of their 
playing. Much of Nguyen’s work focuses on aesthetic striving, playing a game 
in order to gain the aesthetic value of the game: the satisfaction of a well- 
aimed ball slipping between the batter’s legs and cracking into the wickets, 
the spark of deductive realization in seeing that Miss Scarlet must be the 
killer, the smooth flow of a well-placed handhold. Achieving such aesthetic 
goods, Nguyen argues, often requires absorption: despite our varying striving 
reasons for play, in play, these must be put aside, or distanced from our 
attention. ‘If the striving player recalls their reason for playing – the joys of the 
struggle – then they won’t be able to achieve it. Instead, they will be caught in 
a curious form of double-consciousness’ (55).
So, Nguyen focuses on a particular set of the goods of gameplay, aesthetic 
striving goods, wherein the player’s motivation is not to win the game, but 
they are ‘pursuing the win for the sake of the struggle’ (8), and specifically for 
the aesthetic goods associated with that struggle.
Finally, Nguyen argues that games are an artform. Following Dewey’s 
notion that an art ‘crystalizes’ aesthetic experiences from everyday life, he 
argues that as music is the art of sound and painting is the art of vision, so are 
games the art of agency. Our lives are awash with agency, and there are 
aesthetic pleasures associated with them.
Games can refine those pleasures, concentrate them, and present us with novel 
aspects of them. For example: doing math, philosophy, and the like, can give rise 
to aesthetic experiences of calculation, puzzle solving, and glorious leaps of the 
mind. Chess takes this sort of activity and crystallizes it. Chess offers us a shaped 
activity particularly fecund in aesthetically rich experiences of the intellect (102).
On this view, the constitutive constraints and lusory goals of a game encode 
a form of agency; in playing the game, then, we learn about and occupy that 
agency. Cluedo involves fairly simple deductive reasoning (Mystery of the Abby 
is much better), as players carefully eliminate the option-space through their 
questioning. As such, it encodes that kind of deductive, eliminative agency.
Moving forwards, I’ll argue that (1) formal university education can also be 
understood as encoding forms of agency, and that (2) just as in aesthetic 
striving games, some of the goods of humanities education, require particular 
forms of absorption.
Games & education
There is an enormous amount of literature on the nature of education and its 
place in society. Here, I’ll focus on the analogies between Nguyen’s analysis of 
Suitsian games and formal university education. I’ll say something about the 
value of humanities education, before arguing that it encodes agency and 
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involves absorption, then make a few initial points arising from the discussion 
thus far.
Humanities & value
What is valuable about humanities education? However much we or our 
students might value the content of such an education, it is typically the skills 
it brings that are emphasized. These skills are very broad, from writing and 
time-organization, to research, to critical thinking, and so on. As we saw in the 
introduction, these are often emphasized in terms of transferability. They 
don’t just help us do history or social anthropology or whatever, but make 
us attractive as job candidates. Of course, there are also more high-minded 
accounts of the value of such education. Let’s take a single example from 
philosopher and educator Charles Wegener.
[Humanities education aims to] organize scholarship so that it will create and 
nurture individuals as freely functioning participants in the community. It is argued 
that there is no simple link between the acquisition of knowledge and the growth 
of a mind, but that the process of growth is mediated by habitual reflection on 
relationships between various activities. Liberal education, with its emphasis on 
diversity, technique and procedure, rather than on subject matter, is concluded to 
be the working structure of an autonomous intelligence. (Wegener 1978, abstract)
Wegener here makes claims about the value of humanities (for him, ‘liberal 
arts’) education, how that value is gained, and how liberal education achieves 
it. The point of humanities education is far more high-minded than ‘transfer-
able skills’: it provides a kind of autonomous intelligence which matters for 
functioning within democratic communities. Obtaining said autonomous 
intelligence is not simply a matter of knowing more stuff, but rather requires 
a set of diverse, reflective activities. Students researching the humanities, 
even within a single discipline degree program (although this is particularly 
true of traditional ‘liberal arts’ education) are exposed to a variety of perspec-
tives, methods and techniques. In grappling with these, it is claimed, such 
autonomous intelligence is developed.
Where autonomous intelligence and related skills are indeed often empha-
sized as the point of humanities education, it is the value of such skills for 
future employment that are typically pointed to in defences of them. A quick 
internet search coughs up dozens of such articles.3 My aim downstream is not 
to claim that education is not, nor shouldn’t be, economically valuable for 
those so educated. Rather, I’ll suggest that its central place in economic 
systems undermines uptake of autonomous intelligence.
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Education as striving
I want to draw two analogies between humanities education and Nguyen’s 
analysis of games. First, course structure can be understood as encoding 
agency. Second, ‘autonomous intelligence’ is a striving good.
Without arguing that formal education is in fact a game, I think it fairly 
straightforward to demonstrate that, like games, formal education often 
encodes forms of agency. Like games, it provides a simplified, quantified 
space which isolates and potentially develops particular agential modes. In 
standard humanities courses, students gain grades by completing tasks, most 
typically writing essays of particular lengths, with particular structures, and so 
on. There is a fairly clear analogy here between such requirements and 
games. A student might have a pre-lusory goal such as ‘make an argument’ 
or ‘get a first’ or even ‘get a degree’. Various assignments, grading criteria and 
suchlike act as constitutive constraints: the rules by which such goals might 
be achieved. Thus, the lusory goals of formal education emerge. In this 
respect, at least, students taking courses are playing games.
Recall that games encode agency by crystalizing common experiences of 
agency. Eliminative deduction is a common mode of reasoning, and Cluedo 
focuses on that mode via its specific rules of play. Similarly, reasoning, writing, 
communication and suchlike are all common parts of everyday agency. The 
constitutive constraints of university courses to at least some extent crystalize 
these. The activity of, say, writing a philosophy essay is not like writing in 
normal contexts: there are particular constraints, say, related to number of 
words, answering the essay question, rules regarding citations and where 
sources may be drawn from, and so forth. And moreover, these are geared 
towards particular marking criteria, which in combination with (let’s be 
honest) various quirks of the marker, decide the outcome of the assignment. 
It is plausible then, that essay writing, and other such assignments, encode 
modes of agency. And, even more explicitly than for the encoded agency of 
games, these forms are supposed – in fact the point of them is – to be useful 
outside of that context. Writing a good philosophy essay, for example, 
requires a combination of clarity, rigor, focus and creativity: a mode of 
agency, once learned, widely applicable across contexts. The idea that huma-
nities education teaches transferable skills is no joke.
So, if humanities education can be understood as analogous to games in 
encoding agency, what kind of play does developing autonomous intelli-
gence require? Here, I’ll make a psychological gambit: it requires striving. 
Recall that in striving the explicit lusory aim comes apart from the purpose in 
playing. Perhaps achievement play, playing to win, is sufficient for some of 
the skills in humanities education. Good bibliographic practices, for instance. 
But not so for autonomous intelligence. I think it plausible that to learn this, 
students must take risks, actively extend themselves beyond the text they’ve 
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been given to read. This inevitably involves missteps, mistakes and – per-
haps – the occasional bad grade. It further requires a particular kind of 
immersion: the student engages in the practices at hand for their own sake, 
or at least for the enjoyment and satisfaction and challenge of the task, as 
opposed to getting a good grade. In short, students should be striving players 
rather than achieving players in order to adopt the immersion that develop-
ing autonomous intelligence requires.
My gambit is, no doubt, psychological: I could be just plain wrong. And 
note that the claim is not that formal university education is the only way (or 
even a good way) to develop autonomous intelligence (far from it!). 
Regardless, I think it plausible that for at least a significant proportion of 
students such immersed striving is an enabling condition for enculturing 
autonomous intelligence.
Course design & value-capture
Before shifting to misalignment, I’ll outline two upshots for humanities edu-
cation arising from the discussion thus far. The first relates to the analogy 
between education and games, the second to the ‘gamification’ of education. 
The former, perhaps, suggests that in some ways education is insufficiently like 
games. The latter, perhaps, suggests that in some ways education is too game- 
like.
I’ve argued that we can understand various assignments as encoding 
forms of agency. In attempting an essay, a student adopts and learns the 
forms of agency related to that kind of writing. Recall Wegener’s idea that 
intellectual autonomy is built via ‘diverse reflections across numerous activ-
ities’ – not diverse content, but diverse activities. Insofar as Wegener is right 
about this, and insofar as intellectual autonomy is what we want students to 
develop, it is worth asking ourselves whether the standardization of course 
and assignment structure is a good thing. More generally, it is worth asking 
just what forms of agency we are encoding. In my experience, the vast 
majority of assessment in humanities education consists of writing essays 
either in exam settings or otherwise: although the content certainly differs, in 
many ways the agency does not.
Nguyen argues that a major advantage of gameplay isn’t simply the 
particular agencies encoded in games, but that in playing a variety of 
games we learn about, and develop, the flexibility of our agency. To the 
extent that assignment structures in humanities education are homogenous, 
they appear to be teaching students to play the same game over and over 
again. Perhaps it would be better if instead humanities education were 
a series of different games, encoding quite different kinds of agency. This is 
speculative, but my aim is to point out that once we see formal education, 
particularly assessment, as encoding agency, this raises new questions about 
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how we should approach pedagogical design. My hunch is that it underwrites 
reasons for diversity.
A discussion of the relationship between games and education would be 
incomplete without at least passing reference to ‘gamification’. This is, in 
effect, the exporting of game-like features into non-games, most particularly 
quantification and reward-structures. For Nguyen, gamification is not in itself 
problematic. He thinks the problem lies in one of its potential consequences: 
value-capture. Value-capture occurs when our subtle, rich values are trans-
formed into simplistic, quantified values in a detrimental way. Students 
should no-doubt value getting high grades in their education, but there is 
a world of difference between valuing high grades in the interests of a better 
education, or even more job opportunities, and valuing high grades for their 
own sake. Although gamification of pedagogy is typically seen as an educa-
tional tool (e.g., Caponetto, Earp, and Ott 2014), the dangers of phenomena 
like value-capture in education are also commonly recognised (Maiese and 
Hanna 2019). As we’ll see, I think gamification becomes particularly egregious 
when combined with a different phenomenon: misalignment.
Misalignment
As we’ve seen, Nguyen provides a rich account of the agency and art of 
Suitsian games, one which can be applied via analogy (at the very least) to 
pedagogical contexts. He also provides grounds for worry about how value 
capture might undermine the lofty goals of humanities education. In this 
section, I want to highlight a way in which games themselves can go wrong, 
which I’ll call ‘misalignment’. In the next, I’ll suggest misalignment is occur-
ring in humanities education.
Nguyen introduces the notion of stupid games: ‘games that one has to try 
to win to really experience the game, but where the most enjoyable experi-
ence is one of failure’ (41–42). These act as an existence proof for striving play: 
to engage in a stupid game, you must properly submerge yourself in game-
play, strive to win, but winning is not the point. Nguyen’s central example is 
Bag-on-Head. In this game, players obscure their vision by placing paper bags 
on their heads, and then endeavour to remove one another’s bags – if you 
lose your bag, you’re out, watching from the sidelines:
The game, of course, involves lots of stumbling and tripping and flailing around 
by people with bags on their heads. And the best vantage point from to watch 
all this is that of the losers, watching from the side. And, at some point, there 
will be only one person still stumbling blindly around the room with a bag on 
their head, fumbling around for the other nonexistent opponents, while every-
body else gets to watch, desperately trying not to laugh. That last person is the 
winner, and the very best part of the game is seeing how long it takes them to 
figure out that they have, in fact, won. (10)
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Let’s imagine we all go to our rich friend’s soiree and, at some point in the 
night, a round of bag-on-head is suggested. We play to much hilarity and 
highjinks. However, our rich friend is not keen on the game, considering it an 
absurd, silly waste of time (perhaps they are obstinate achievement players!). 
As everyone agrees on playing a second game, our rich friend, with a sly grin, 
raises their hand and offers their extraordinary collection of Fabergé eggs as 
a prize to the victor.
No doubt we, the partygoers, will all play the second game, and no doubt 
we will endeavour to win. However, I imagine our capacity to enjoy the 
absurdity – to gain the specific aesthetic good that striving in a stupid 
game engenders – that is, our being properly submerged, will be under-
mined. The stakes of the game will be so high that those who are out will 
likely be unable to enjoy watching the potential future-millionaires stumble 
about. Those still in the game will be too focused on the transformative 
capacity those eggs could have for our lives – debts repaid, houses pur-
chased, retirement sorted – that we will be trying to win, but crucially not able 
to be submerged in the specific way required to enjoy the stupidity.
This is an example of ‘misalignment’. Some of the goods of gameplay 
require particular forms of submersion, but the consequences of winning or 
losing can undermine precisely those forms. Misalignment occurs in gameplay 
when (1) there is some particular good gained through submerged striving 
play, and (2) the consequences of achievement undermine players’ capacity 
to be submerged, and thus gain that good. Note that misalignment need not 
be perfect: some players might be indifferent to riches and still enjoy the 
game of bag-on-head, or others might, despite themselves, get swept up in 
the idiocy of the game and forget the high stakes. But regardless, it is 
psychologically plausible that in the described scenario the consequences 
of victory – a collection of mind-bogglingly expensive jewelled eggs – will 
block the immersion required to enjoy the absurdity.
The underlying point of misalignment is that the achievement of certain 
goods in gameplay often require matching stakes. Poker for pennies might be 
less exciting than poker for pounds, but the former might offer freedom to 
experiment that the latter lacks.
Misaligned education
I’ve suggested it is plausible that the more high-falutin’ gains of humanities 
education, which I’m calling ‘autonomous intelligence’, requires a form of 
immersion allowing students to take risks, be creative, and to engage in the 
work for its own sake. In other words, just as striving play involves 
a disconnect from the consequences of achievement and the player’s immer-
sion, so too does gaining autonomous education require striving. I’ve also 
introduced a way in which striving games can go wrong: misalignment. Here, 
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the consequences of achievement undermine the kinds of immersion 
required for gaining particular goods. I’ll now bring these together and 
argue that the place of university degrees in future lives undermines the 
development of an autonomous intelligence: humanities education is 
misaligned.
Recall the two goods of humanities education with which I opened: the 
development of an autonomous intelligence, and the development of skills 
which future employers will value. Indeed, future employers may exactly 
value autonomous intelligence, but I think it plausible that the emphasis 
on – and fact of – future success relying on doing well at university under-
mines the kind of creative risk-taking that developing an autonomous intelli-
gence requires. To draw out the analogy, just as the future prospect of 
Fabergé eggs likely breaks a player of bag-on-head’s submersion towards 
absurd fun, a student’s future job prospects undermines their capacity to 
discuss and debate ideas, read complex texts, and write engaged essays, with 
the kind of submersion and striving required to develop an autonomous 
intelligence. Note that this being the case turns on various features of 
student’s psychology. It need not undermine all students’ immersion, just 
as I might find myself immersed in bag-on-head despite the artificially raised 
stakes.
That achieving a particular result – in the UK a 2.1 or first, say – acts as 
a barrier to employment or other future prospects, raises the stakes of 
achievement in the quantified outputs of education in way that opens the 
door to misalignment. Education’s cost in terms of, say, student loans, further 
raises the stakes. This makes assessment a curious double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, providing results in assessment, be they quantified or more 
qualitative, are in some sense necessary as they provide the constitutive 
constraints of the ‘game’: rules are required to set the aims and structures 
within which students learn and occupy the kinds of agency that educators 
wish to engender. But on the other hand, they are a constant reminder that, 
for many students at least, aspects of their future lives turn on their results. In 
those university environments where students are also constantly bom-
barded with job fairs, employment seminars, and internship opportunities 
the message is loud and clear: the point of this education is for future job 
prospects, and for many this plausibly breaks immersion via misalignment. Or 
so I suspect. To what extent this is the case is an empirical question requiring 
empirical investigation, but certainly anecdotally, and in my experience, the 
constant reminders of university being for future job prospects make stu-
dents conservative and risk-averse in their learning.
This, I think, is particularly pernicious when combined with value-capture. 
Consider the UK government’s use of Longitudinal Education Outcomes (LEO) 
data. This measures ‘how much UK graduates of different courses at different 
universities are earning, either one, three or five years since graduating’ 
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(Parliament & Government 2019, 1), with attempts to control for socio- 
economic background and so on. Such data is explicitly encouraged to be 
used by students in making decisions about which universities to attend and 
which degrees to seek (although the government won’t use it for funding 
decisions). LEO data allows us to infer the earning capacity of an average 
student with a particular degree from a particular university. In philosophy, 
the relevantly high earning-potential (compared to other humanities sub-
jects) of graduates is typically held up as a way of pushing back against the 
perception that such degrees are useless.
LEO data is intended to be a proxy, and useful in combination with other 
factors in helping students make decisions about their education. However, 
as we’ve seen, value capture occurs when a rich, opaque value is replaced 
by a simple, quantified value with negative results. Continual focus on the 
results of assessments, degree qualifications, and the relationship between 
these and future earning potential surely make value-capture loom large. 
A student interested in developing critical, rigorous, reflective and creative 
thinking finds themselves aiming for a first, say. But value-capture is not the 
end of the story. Because even if capture does not occur, misalignment 
likely still undermines immersion. Further, misalignment plausibly blocks 
students who are only interested in getting a degree, those for whom 
education is simply valuable for future prospects, from becoming immersed 
despite themselves.
The quantification of education, and its being tied to further job prospects, 
means students who value education for its own sake must actively work 
against both value capture and misalignment if they are to develop autono-
mous intelligence. Moreover, it likely makes the achievement of such goals 
yet more the domain of those with the privilege of secure financial futures.
Mitigating strategies
Specific solutions to misalignment in humanities education are beyond both 
my paygrade and available space, but the present analysis does point 
towards several strategies for mitigating educational misalignment.
Generally, misalignment is due to a mismatch between the requirements 
of immersion and the consequences of success or failure. Thus, solutions 
require de-coupling. Two rather blunt solutions would be to either simply 
deny the value of the goods immersion brings or block the consequences. In 
the present context, this would be to say either that autonomous intelligence 
is worthless, or to make it such that university results play no role in future 
employment. The former is – I hope for obvious reasons – undesirable, the 
latter opens a range of complex questions about how educations fits into 
society, who it is for, and how it is funded that I think are urgent but I can’t 
hope to tackle here.
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We can divide less blunt solutions, I think, into individual and structural 
solutions.
Individual solutions aim to provide students with the resources to 
become appropriately immersed despite misalignment. For many this is 
likely possible. Professional athletes, for analogy, also face misalignment. 
To play well, they must be immersed in play. But in many competitions the 
stakes of victory are extremely high. And thus, the professional athlete must 
find a way to be immersed despite the consequences of victory or loss. 
Perhaps for students too, such psychological solutions are available. 
Anecdotally, some of my students report that open discussion of both 
value capture and misalignment have helped them understand some of 
the challenges they face with immersion, and this in itself has aided in their 
striving.
Structural solutions seek to mitigate misalignment by manipulating the 
constitutive constraints of courses and assessment. One approach is simply to 
lower the stakes for some assessments. One fairly common structural feature 
of university degrees is that earlier assessments matter less for degree classi-
fication than later assessments, both within a course and across a degree 
program. However, in the context of the whole education system being 
misaligned, as students see the value of work in terms of degree classification, 
the result for those earlier assessments is often not more immersion, but less 
effort. Another set of structural solutions target assessment design. Are there 
ways of targeting autonomous intelligence more directly and explicitly, and 
so, in a sense optimizing assessment towards the kind of absorption 
required? Perhaps.
None of these solutions are perfect, but neither are they mutually exclu-
sive. Potentially all of them open tricky questions about access, privilege and 
the purpose and point of education. And indeed, given that misalignment 
arises from how education itself is situated in society, both strategic and 
individual strategies enacted within a university context can only be seen as 
mitigating. Regardless, if we genuinely believe in autonomous intelligence’s 
value, and my psychological gambit pertaining to it requiring absorption pays 
out, then humanities education’s misalignment is a tension we must both 
confront and navigate.
Let’s return to our analogy between games and education. Considering 
value-capture, we might worry that the quantified, simplified nature of 
education is too game-like; threatening to morph the rich, subtle values of 
education into something much lesser. But considering misalignment, we 
might also say that education is insufficiently game-like. For many games, it is 
the lack of stakes, the low-consequences of success and failure, which enable 
the kind of absorbed, aesthetically-rich striving that Nguyen’s analysis focuses 
on; insofar as education is misaligned, analogous goods are undermined, 
difficult-to-reach, missed, and lost.
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